Verify an evidence pack

Drop a Velin evidence pack PDF below. This page recomputes the pack's hashes and Ed25519 signature against the platform's published public keys and reports the outcome. The PDF is processed entirely in your browser; nothing is uploaded.

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Settings

Keys URLThe verifier fetches keys.json from here to look up the public key referenced by the pack's fingerprint. Override if you're verifying packs against a non-production deployment.Public key (air-gapped)Paste a public key here to skip the network fetch entirely. The verifier still cross-checks that sha256(public_key_bytes) matches the fingerprint embedded in the pack.Strict mode — treat warnings (drift, pre-chain packs) as failures.

What a passing verification proves

Every embedded JSON attachment matches the sha256 the producer claimed for it at export time, so no individual attachment has been altered since the pack was signed.
The pack content hash — the sha256 over the canonical state, audit log, approvals history, and content manifest in a fixed order — recomputes to the value the producer wrote into the signature manifest.
The producer's Ed25519 signature over that pack content hash verifies against the platform public key whose fingerprint the pack names.
The named fingerprint genuinely corresponds to its published public-key bytes — the verifier independently recomputes sha256(public_key_bytes) and rejects any mismatch.
If the pack carries audit chain inputs (AUDIT_CHAIN_VERSION 1.0.0 onward), every entry's hash links to the previous entry, end-to-end. Older packs skip this check with a visible warning rather than silently passing.

What it does not prove

A passing verification proves cryptographic integrity. It does not assert that the deletion the pack describes actually happened in the source system, that the right people approved it, or that the source data was in the claimed scope. Those judgements belong to the auditor reading the attachments — the pack's canonical state, audit log, and approvals history exist to make that reading defensible, not to replace it.